Misadventures of An Irresponsible Investor by Gray, J
Irr itations
I was once arguing heatedly that boards of
superannuation / pension funds spend excessive time on
environmental, social, and governance (ESG) factors relative
to their potential to improve members’ benefits when my
rant was interrupted by a trustee gently asking why I was
so irritated (and irritating).1 After some soul-searching,
I have a few answers.
Some investors are irritated by the ever-changing names
and nature of the topic. To them the plethora of acronyms –
SRI (socially responsible investing), CSR (corporate social
responsibility), PRI (principles of responsible investing), ESG,
EI (ethical investing), ETI (economically targeted investing),
II (impact investing) … – indicates a search for a catchy title.
I side with the less cynical, who see it more as a healthy search
for fundamental issues and modus operandi. The current version
seems to be that “investors should better account for the often
longer-term impact of environmental, social and governance
factors on the future cash flows of their investments.” Analysts
and portfolio managers claim they have always accounted for
such non-financial factors, the CEO’s health and the likelihood
of regulation being oft-cited instances. Investors in long-
duration assets such as infrastructure have long recognized
and been highly sensitive to all three of the letters E, S, and
G. Nonetheless, the movement may have driven analysts and
portfolio managers to go beyond the cosmetic to attach a
modicum of substance to non-analytic factors.
In principle, because the above definition eschews moral
and ethical considerations unless they affect cash flows and
valuations, it resides comfortably within the normal paradigm
of economic rationalism. In practice, purely moral and ethical
considerations continue to underlie much ESG discussion and
decision making, regardless of their effect on cash flows. The
current British Under-Secretary of the Department of Works
and Pensions supports that practice, seeing “no reason why
trustees [of pension funds] cannot consider moral and social
criteria in addition to their usual [financial] criteria” (qtd. in
Johnson and de Graaf 2009, 6) – considerations that can readily
run counter to fiduciaries’ responsibility to act solely in the best
interests of beneficiaries.2
But even that narrow definition of ESG irritates, because
boards do spend too much time on it relative to its potential
to improve members’ returns. One of the initiators of the
United Nations Principles for Responsible Investing (UNPRI)
pointedly suggested that because ESG doesn’t detract from
returns (a far from settled assertion), investors should be as
responsible as possible. But this ignores the direct cost of
acquiring ESG information and the indirect cost of spending
less time on opportunities with greater potential benefits. A
hallmark of committees is a predilection for avoiding difficult
and uncertain tasks by instead focusing on those that make
committee members feel good, or those that solve a problem
well chosen for its simplicity and immediacy. ESG offers scope
for both avoidance techniques. For example, by spending time
favoring and selecting well-governed companies and countries,
Jack Gray is at the Paul




Limited; and Rawson East
P/L, Sydney (Australia).





The ESG movement is nudging toward an unhealthy state of political correctness,
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ESG investors risk overpaying for the “privilege” of owning
them, almost regardless of price. In emerging markets, a bias
toward countries that rank high on ESG factors will lead
investors to miss the opportunities expressed in the adage that
the greatest returns in emerging markets occur when a country
progresses from absolutely rotten to just plain awful, though
it may be the better-governed companies that contribute most
to greater country returns.
E for engagement is largely a time-wasting feel-good activity,
especially for boards of smaller funds dealing with companies
with broad and varied shareholders. According to one ESG
believer, most of the activity classified as “engagement” is
dancing around with corporate management, who are masters
at engaged listening inactivity, a core competency they develop
from explaining themselves to hordes of analysts and portfolio
managers. The investors who can best trigger substantive
corporate change are (some) activist hedge funds and (some)
operationally focused private equity managers, though even
their success rate is limited despite their substantial and
sometimes controlling stakes. The ESG movement could
learn from them.
Thank You for Smoking
My irritation flows in diametrically opposite directions, toward
cynics and true believers alike. Cynical funds use UNPRI as
a marketing ploy, or as a form of “ethical narcissism,” or to
protect careers. Cynicism reaches its nadir with the CEO who
prices his ESG overlay service as a form of career insurance,
with fund managers who sign up because they’ve been told
they’ll get no business unless they do, and with Citigroup’s
Vikram Pandit’s commitment to “responsible finance,” surely
the epitome of empty feel-good marketing. As for true believers,
many, especially in the United States, are religious about ESG
in the most pejorative sense, being possessed of a deep and
abiding self-righteousness that sees ESG as the dominant, if
not the sole, issue. Theirs is a religion that brooks neither
disagreement nor discussion. I once pitched a tobacco-free
American equity mandate to a committee of such zealots.
Showing an out-of-character sniff of commercial nous, I didn’t
mention that the tobacco sector of the S&P500 had been the
best performer over the past 30 years, and by a long way. I
did, however, plead for the freedom to short selected tobacco
stocks, an action that might damage the stock price and help
the committee’s moral cause. My naïve plea was irrationally
and irritatingly dismissed with “We want nothing to do
with tobacco.”
The first CEO of the Canada Pension Plan Investment Board
was once pilloried because CPPIB held tobacco stocks.
Although concurrently serving on an oncology hospital board,
he defended CPPIB’s holdings: As a fiduciary, he saw his
responsibility as generating the highest return possible within
acceptable levels of risk; as a citizen, he saw his responsibility
as actively campaigning against tobacco. Courageously, he
wrote an op-ed piece to that effect in the Globe and Mail
(MacNaughton 2004). He was a responsible fiduciary investor
and a responsible citizen. In the spirit of the Nobel Prize–
winning Dutch economist Jan Tinbergen’s “two goals, two
instruments,” this is as it should be, though the dichotomy
will fray at the edges if, for instance, tobacco companies
spend their earnings lobbying against government regulations.
The “universal owner” idea tries to extricate investors from
this predicament by arguing that successful lobbying will result
in externalities, such as increased public spending on health
and a consequent rise in taxes, that will lower returns on the
balance of the portfolio. It seems unimaginable that, over the
past 30 years, that effect would have outweighed the returns
from tobacco.
More worrying (to me) is how this simple dichotomy leans
toward Milton Friedman’s view that a firm’s only social
responsibility is to (legally) generate profits, a view that would
uniquely position firms as having no broader responsibilities
to society. My total rejection of that position exposes me to a
conundrum: Is a pension fund’s only social responsibility to
(legally) generate returns for members? Not for the first time,
I find myself struggling.
Value in Investing in Values?
Implicitly, and sometimes explicitly, ESG advocates claim
that eventually investment factors and society’s values will
converge, or at least will be highly correlated, so the financial
effect of those values should be included as portfolio risk factors.
This claim relies on three heroic assumptions.
The first is that they will converge or be correlated, an assumption
fraught with sociological, political, and philosophical challenges.
Even when a society’s values are enshrined in black-letter law,
convergence may remain an ideal. For a generation, discrimination
against women has been illegal in most developed Western
countries, yet companies that discriminate through unwritten
hiring policies, lower wages, and glass ceilings continue to
thrive and do not appear to be priced at a discount to fair value.
That supposed risk factor has not materialized. The globalization
of investments makes convergence even less likely, as rarely
will values globalize. Values will diverge locally for the same
reasons that languages (even artificial computer languages)
diverge locally. Inevitably, these local divergences of values
will cause friction with global investment factors.
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The second implicit assumption is that society’s values are
“good,” “moral,” and “responsible,” one that smacks of the
debunkedWhig historiography, so popular in Victorian England,
that history is intrinsically “progressive.” The ubiquity of war
and the abject refusal of countries to disarm, Costa Rica
excepted, is the most glaring of many counterexamples. Short-
termism is a more apposite example. While we can all agree
that an excessive focus on the short term is destructive in
multifarious ways, short-termism is one of society’s current
values, and it shows no sign of abating.
Assumption three holds that investors can monetize convergence
because eventually society’s values, such as the demand for
clean air, will be priced in by the market. Maybe so. But
monetizing convergence is notoriously difficult, because both
its path and its timing are largely unpredictable. The social cost
of alcohol and the need to regulate it have been understood
at least since the Code of Hammurabi 4,200 years ago. Yet
(non-Islamic) societies have done little beyond the margins
to hedge alcohol’s well-documented damage. Closer to our
temporal and cultural home, witness the path and consequences
of the United States’ failed 13-year experiment to prohibit alcohol
consumption. The link between lung cancer and smoking was
first broadly publicized with the American Surgeon General’s
1964 report (though somewhat earlier Germany’s Nazi
government had fought an effective public anti-cancer campaign
against smoking). Yet a generation and a half later, many
Western European countries have taken only minimal action,
and sometimes none at all, on this costly public-health issue.
“Eventually,” then, is best measured not in years but in
generations, a unit so large that investors’ default position
should be deep skepticism about when and how to hedge
convergence risk. Much ESG discussion is strikingly naïve
about long-term investing, as if it were synonymous with
buy-and-hold (it isn’t), clearly defined (it isn’t), appropriate
for everyone (it isn’t), and relatively straightforward to get to
(it isn’t), and as if, once there, it were a land of milk and honey
(it isn’t). John Maynard Keynes, the most profound of long-
term investors, eloquently warned that “it is not wise to look
too far ahead; our powers of prediction are slight, our
command over results infinitesimal” (Keynes 1936, ch. 12).
Timing uncertainty induced one CIO to be “long brown / short
green” until the signals clarify somewhat, at which point he’ll
edge to the hedge of “long green / short brown.” Given the
world’s hesitant-to-nonexistent move in the direction of green,
a world where coal is resurging and is expected to overtake oil
as a fuel by 2025, is he being irresponsible? As a citizen, he has
a responsibility to push the world toward green; as a fiduciary,
he has a distinctly different responsibility. The Norwegian Oil
Fund has a forceful ESG investment policy yet invests in a
company that is logging Indonesian forests. Simultaneously,
the Norwegian government buys forests (not in Indonesia) as
part of its social contract to defend the global environment.
The accusation of hypocrisy is misguided. The fund is acting
responsibly in the interests of people qua fund beneficiaries,
while the government is acting responsibly in the interests of
people qua citizens. The two goals demand two instruments,
as uncomfortable and irritating as that is.
Hypertheticals
In a 2003 interview with a journalist, my irritation expanded
into anger as I expounded on Tony Blair’s hypocrisy in
encouraging torture in Iraq, and promoting a British company
selling cattle prods to the Indonesian military, while requiring
British pension trustees to formulate an SRI statement, implicitly
demanding ethical standards from trustees higher than those of
the ambient society. While admitting that, like all ad hominem
attacks, mine was irrelevant to the issue, and under no provocation
from the journalist, I offered her a hypothetical. (Advice to the
young: Never, ever offer a journalist a hypothetical. And mine
was a doozy.) The place is Sweden, the time is early 1942,
and I’m a trustee of a pension plan. Through a private equity
deal, the plan has the opportunity to own 100% of a domestic
company with an exclusive contract to make gas chambers and
export them to Germany. Everything suggests that Germany
will expand to the Urals and beyond and claim its sought-after
Lebensraum once all Jews, Bolsheviks, Asiatics, and other
“undesirables” are exterminated, a program expected to take
a generation. The incomparable returns expected from this
single investment, and its moderate risks, make it a spectacular
and unique opportunity, one that cannot be finessed by the
realpolitik of finding an alternative investment with very
similar characteristics and expectations. What should I do?
And what should I do under the even darker scenario in
which the company won’t survive without my fund’s capital?
A literal interpretation of the Sole Purpose Test offers no
wiggle room, because the members will be materially worse
off if I don’t invest. My answer was to resign as a fiduciary
and, as a citizen, to take action to stop the company from
manufacturing its product.
The article and my picture appeared under the headline “Invest
in torture; it’s the only moral thing to do.” And that was only
the beginning. After two years of protracted negotiations, the
manager I represented had just won a mandate from an SRI
fund. My comments found their way to the fund’s deeply self-
righteous board, which irrationally threatened to fire their CEO
and cancel our mandate. I wrote to the CEO, apologizing not
for my views but for causing her grief. I felt obliged to mention
that my mother’s entire family had been fed into German gas
chambers, so the hypothetical was not created lightly. Both of
us, and the mandate, survived, but only just.
10 Volume 5 • Issue 2 • Fall 2012
Rotman International Journal
of Pension Management
Volume 5 • Issue 2
Fall 2012
3-Gray_Misadventures_with Rebuttals + Rotman AD_D4:Layout 1  8/23/12  1:46 PM  Page 4
The underlying moral issue remains. A few years later, when I
was a fund CIO, one of our largest international holdings was
Halliburton, which was making massive profits selling services
to the American military in Iraq. Members’ benefits were
enhanced at the cost of bloodshed and mayhem. Should I have
“Wall Street Walked,” and sold out, or “Wall Street Talked” by
engaging with Halliburton executives and encouraging them to
switch to growing organic carrots? On the criteria of the British
Under-Secretary of Pensions mentioned earlier, I should have
walked. Perhaps Sole Purpose does need reframing within a
broader discourse, but only with extreme caution to ensure
that beneficial owners remain the sharp and primary focus.
Responding to Responsibil ity
The use of responsible is yet another source of irritation.
Single emotive words like “responsible” and “sustainable”
may make for good marketing, but only by doing violence
to the complexity of the underlying issues. The moral high
ground implicit in the R of UNPRI brands those who disagree
as irresponsible. They are not. Like many who believe we no
longer have the luxury of muddling through on climate change,
I’m increasingly drawn to the nuclear energy option as a
relatively quick fix to save the planet, at the admittedly massive
risk of waste disposal. Might nuclear be the responsible and
sustainable option? How will UNPRI investors respond to
Australia’s forthcoming policies of selling uranium to India
and opening new mines? In principle, they need not respond,
provided the “nuclear risk factor” has been appropriately
accounted for in their portfolio construction. But even leaving
aside the challenge of “appropriate accounting,” in practice
the emotive pull of the R word will likely drive decisions on
moral, not investment, grounds.
Funds themselves are irresponsible in failing to act collectively
in their beneficiaries’ interests, a failure (intentionally?)
reinforced by agency effects and especially by competition.
Arthur Leavitt, ex-head of the Securities Exchange Commission,
spoke at a client conference a few years after he had been
bruised and beaten by corporate America’s lobbying machine
for trying to have executive options expensed. Standing before
us, he asked, “And where were you? Why didn’t you support
me?” Silence spoke eloquently to our collective guilt. Pension
funds and investment managers, some signatories to the UNPRI,
all lacked the moral clarity and courage to act in beneficiaries’
best interests. And we still do. The SEC continues to be squeezed
for resources, while any proposed actions are instantly lobbied
against in Congress. Responsible collective leadership remains
sadly lacking.
Some tout sustainability as almost the ultimate responsibility.
The strength of the word’s emotional tug is a function of its
highly elastic meaning. Perhaps the cleanest of many definitions
is “the ability of assets, markets, firms and economies to adapt
to and to thrive in changing environments without damaging
other assets, markets or economies.” But even under that broad
definition, sustainability is neither intrinsically good nor
universally desirable. The most sustainable and often the most
profitable industries produce goods and services designed to
kill and maim. Would that they were unsustainable.
Sustainability is an extremely rare exception for organizations,
markets, firms, assets, societies, empires, languages, and – over
evolutionary time scales – even for species. Mere survival is
challenge enough and may be undesirable in a dynamic and
competitive economy, where death and birth are the “natural”
order of things and where organizations struggle mightily
to maintain energy, enthusiasm, flexibility, commitment,
productivity, and growth for more than brief periods. Companies
survive in the S&P500 index for an average of only 15 years.
Rare exceptions, such as IBM and General Electric, have
continually reinvented themselves over a century, successfully
adapting to changing environments while just surviving near-
death experiences. On the other hand, General Motors and
(almost) the entire airline industry have survived for a similar
period only by being propped up and bailed out. Yet from an
investment perspective, GE is not more desirable than GM
just because it’s sustainable. Desirability depends crucially
on the price paid.
Occupying the Leadership Vacuum
Amajor cause of my irritation has roots in the dearth of
political leadership reflected in democracy’s ineluctable
decay to plutocratic populism, driven by the agenda of minimal
government, low-to-no taxes, market fundamentalism, and
extreme individualism. To my irritation/anger, corporations
have occupied the leadership vacuum, thus fulfilling Dwight
Eisenhower’s 60-year-old warning of the incipient dangers of
the “military–industrial complex,” which, since the deregulation
of the 1980s, must be augmented by “financial.” I now realize
that I have unfairly projected my irritation/anger onto the ESG
movement because it, too, is trying to occupy that vacuum.
I resent the policy of everything for sale – highways, museums,
schools, even open space. Privatization has, broadly, been
wonderful for vampire squids and other Wall Street denizens,
a boon for institutional investors and their beneficiaries, but
neutral to poor for society as a whole. As citizens, we were
irresponsible in allowing governments to privatize excessively,
and often poorly. As fiduciaries, we were responsible in providing
capital for privatizations. And that is as it should be. Pension
fund fiduciaries should not make policy decisions for society.
When I worked at a large Australian manager, the Arnott family
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agreed to sell their eponymous biscuit manufacturer to
Campbell’s Soup. Public anger was directed at us, as Arnott’s
largest institutional shareholder, through comments such as
“You can’t sell an Australian icon to the Americans” and
“You’re irresponsible acting against the national interest.”
As a citizen, I didn’t want us, the fund manager, making
decisions about the national interest – that was government’s
role. As a fiduciary, our decision was simple, because the offer
price was well above fair value, even without Campbell’s
projected growth in Asia. We sold our entire holdings, and
the responsible officer withstood bile spewed at him by shock
jocks despite having doing the right thing for beneficiaries.
Would ESG investors judge our divestment as irresponsible
because we did not sufficiently account for S? SRI investors
certainly did. That officer’s character was called on again
when Alan Bond, characterized by some as one of Australia’s
corporate thugs, tried to stack a company board with his
acolytes. The decision to vote against stacking fell to that
same officer, who properly voted against it on the grounds of
G. Bond’s response was to threaten him over the phone and,
it is believed, to have his backyard shed firebombed. We
under-appreciate the courage that is sometimes needed to
do the right and responsible thing.
As an idealist without illusions, I’m sympathetic to those who
want to change the world for the better. Given the vacuum of
government leadership, perhaps it is up to trustees and other
investors to lead, but only if doing so in the best interests of
the beneficial owners. Why, then, don’t UNPRI funds engage
with governments as firmly as they do with private companies?
Global pension funds could tell governments that unless they
act more decisively on climate change, funds will sell their
sovereign bonds on the pure investment grounds that failure to
act will be priced in, as might already be happening with some
corporate bonds. Unless the government acquiesced, yields
would spike, dragging down economic growth. Pension funds
could become “NextGen” bond-market vigilantes, but vigi-
lantes dedicated to goodness, virtue, and purity.
Just after Lehman Brothers collapsed, I was at a conference
of large global pension funds. The brewing crisis provided
a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity for fiduciaries to assert
collective power, and I suggested we draft a manifesto to
that effect, to occupy Wall Street, at least in writing. I asked
for support from two public-sector funds, both signatories of
UNPRI, and was met with “We’re public-sector funds, so
we can’t get involved in politics.” Is that responsible? The
Street had no such compunctions. Investment banks compete
viciously, but they act as one when threatened. Goldman
Sachs had already tripled their lobbying budget, and Wells
Fargo now spends (a declared) US$50 million a year on
lobbying. With remarkable speed, the financial sector has
returned to its old ways, and fiduciaries didn’t even fight.
End Rant
The separation of fiduciary and citizens’ duties leaves me
unsatisfied and self-irritated. Suppose that forestry is a
component of the global equity benchmark, and that the
logging company mentioned above denudes the entire Sarawak
forest. Investors will extract alpha, a positive for beneficiaries,
but at the cost of reducing the future index return (beta). Should
fiduciaries care?3 After all, the dynamic nature of an index will
always see industries die and new ones born. But should they
care as fiduciaries if logging denudes almost all the planet’s
forests? Does the Sole Purpose Test need to be rethought in
the context of such disaster scenarios, as was suggested in
obiter dicta in the British Scargill case, and more forcefully
in the 1978 New York City Teachers case?4
As citizens, we need to challenge and change that most
dominant of all paradigms – the eternal and ubiquitous desire
for economic growth. Even the British Conservative PM David
Cameron has, to screams of abuse, hinted at this by suggesting
an index of well-being or happiness to sit alongside GDP. That
would encourage a cautious re-assessment of Sole Purpose to
tentatively move it away from its narrow concern with direct
financial benefits.
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to this article. See end of this article for their comments.
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Endnotes
1. This article is an expanded version of an after-dinner speech to the
Responsible Investment Research Forum, Sydney University, November
2011. I especially thank Susheela PeresdaCosta and Danyelle Guyatt for
the trenchant criticism that is so essential but so rare. Thanks also to Julian
Poulter, Rob Bauer, Ross Barry, Rob Prugue, Gareth Abley, Greg Hickling,
and Steve Hall. The views expressed here are personal and not necessarily
representative of any organizations with which I am affiliated. Brickbats
and bouquets welcome at jackgray08@live.com.au.
2. The head of communications at the Swedish fund AP7 was recently quoted
as saying, “The primary driver behind ESG isn’t simply yield. It’s values,
both on behalf of the people in the industry and the societies around it”
(Riley 2012). Beneficiaries don’t even rate a mention. Case closed.
3. Suppose an investor has a 20-year horizon; that the initial and sustainable
annual β is 8%; and that she can extract an annual α of 2% for T years,
but at the cost of reducing the sustainable β to 6%. The 20-year annualized
α-extracting return exceeds the pure β return only if T > 10. With a more
realistic T = 3, the pure β return is 20% greater, so she should care. But she
should also account for the expected return from new opportunities she
might capture precisely because β was lowered by her activities.
4. The Court in Cowan v. Scargill, [1985] Ch 270, found against a union
trustee of a miners’ fund who resisted investing in alternative sources of
energy on the grounds that it would be against members’ interests. The
Court ruled that he had acted in their interests as members of the union,
not as members of the fund. The trustee had also resisted overseas investing
on the grounds that it would so weaken the British economy that members
would be materially disadvantaged. Obiter dicta, the Court sympathized
with an argument against investing if those investments would likely result
in a substantial destruction of the entire economy. In the Teachers’ case
(Withers v. Teacher’s Retirement System of City of New York, 595 F.2d
1210 [1979]), the Court allowed a public pension fund to be used to bail
out New York City via an investment that fell well short of traditional
standards of prudence.
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Th r e e R e a c t i o n s a n d D i f f e r i n g V i e w s o n
“ M i s a d v e n t u r e s o f a n I r r e s p o n s i b l e I n v e s t o r ”
In order to encourage thoughtful and continuous discussion in this area we invited Jane Ambachtsheer,
Stephen Davis and Keith Johnson, three individuals in the area of responsible investing, to share their
thoughts on Jack Gray’s article “Misadventures of an Irresponsible Investor”.
Jane Ambachtsheer is Partner and Global Head of Responsible Investment with Mercer (Canada).
It was a pleasure to read Jack Gray’s intelligent critique of responsible investment. I have deep sympathy with several the points he
makes, and concur with some of the conclusions drawn about how fiduciary behavior could evolve in the future.1
First Things First
Before getting to that, I wish to respond to a couple of points that Jack makes. First, he argues that trustees spend too much of their limited
time considering environmental, social, and governance (ESG) factors, relative to their potential to improve member returns. Second,
he argues one reason they do this is that addressing ESG concerns is both a (relatively) straightforward and a “feel good” affair. I wish I
could agree with Jack on these two points (it would make my life considerably easier), but they are not consistent with my experiences:
• Too much time is spent on ESG: Mercer’s Responsible Investment consulting unit is the largest in the industry, yet, with 15
people, we represent 1.2% of Mercer Investments’ headcount. Further, a significant portion of our time is spent on research,
intellectual capital development, and working with jumbo funds. I would surmise that – on average – pension funds spend less
than 0.5% of their consultant usage (hours or budget) on ESG-related topics. However, recent research suggests that climate
change alone (i.e., just one of many ESG issues) accounts for 10% of risk in a hypothetical pension plan (Mercer 2011).
Therefore, I would argue that current time allocated significantly underweights potential value at risk (by a factor of 20).
• ESG is straightforward and a “feel good” exercise: Trying to wrestle boards and committees to develop a common understanding
of ESG – let alone a sensible approach to it – is a significant challenge. The topic typically creates great division, and the majority
of financial professionals have – like Jack – a lingering sense that a moral agenda secretly underpins the field. Certainly, pockets
of this do exist.2 Yet a broader set of forces has lifted the field out of a feel-good affair and catapulted it into the heart of risk
management. This reflects the convergence of thinking about the path of our economic future in light of developments across
several fronts, including demographics, the environment, communications and consumption patterns, global governance, and
broad systemic interdependence.3 These developments render historically non-financial / non-reported information increasingly
relevant to the short- and long-term performance of individual investments (companies, infrastructure assets, buildings), portfolio
management, and the sustainability of capital markets as a whole. Figuring out how to manage associated risks and pursue
related opportunities is a complex task. I suspect Jack’s remarks about the deficiencies of an approach that sees investors
“only invest in the good companies” may refer to a narrow segment of funds. The central objective of the ESG movement is
to broaden and sharpen the lens through which investors see the world, markets, and particular asset classes and investments –
what they do with this information will depend on many things (their current position, time horizon, asset class, risk budget,
etc.). The reality today is that, broadly speaking, the financial industry doesn’t “get” the need for ESG analysis. Thousands of
MBAs and CFAs graduate every year with no formal training on how to acquire, assess, and value this type of information.
This is complex!
Jack’s rant is an acknowledgment of the complexity of the issues in question: there are no simple answers, as illustrated by his
frustration and, at times, contradictory thoughts. On the more complex issue of the roles, rights, and responsibilities of fiduciaries,
I both agree and don’t agree with elements of Jack’s argument.
First, he states that “pension funds should not be making policy decisions for society.” He then articulates his disappointment at the
lack of leadership pension funds have shown in asserting “collective power on behalf of their beneficial owners.”
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We live in a world where the promises of liberal democracy are unrealized at best, and there is an increasing absence of commercially
independent politics. Three forces are broadly recognized by political scientists in shaping global governance frameworks: companies,
governments, and non-governmental organizations. Investors are the missing stakeholder (Ambachtsheer 2011), and a potentially
powerful one with – critically – a long-term outlook (at least, this applies to pension funds). In this sense, I believe they can and
must advocate for sensible policy outcomes. And they will only be effective if they do so with a unified, or at least coordinated,
voice. While this practice is becoming more common, the scales (of long-term public and market vs. short-term commercial) are
still seriously out of balance.4 The trick will be to shift some of the misplaced focus on active management and security selection
toward managing beta through capital market engagement.
Where do we go from here?
Jack concludes with a rallying cry to challenge the eternal desire for economic growth, which could also allow for a re-assessment
of the Sole Purpose Test. Such a re-assessment is already underway, with a small but growing body of literature exploring the role
of fiduciaries in policy engagement in the context of loyalty, prudence, intergenerational equity, and the precautionary principle
(see, e.g., Hawley et al. 2011).
In thinking about how we might put these concepts into action on a broader scale, we come back to some of the stumbling blocks
discussed at the beginning of Jack’s article (such as the plethora of names used by the responsible investment industry and the
negative reaction many of them elicit).
• Do we frame these concepts in a way that engages and motivates boards and senior executives at long-horizon asset owners?
• How can the necessary “policy engagement units” be properly staffed, and their success measured and rewarded, in major
funds around the world?
• How do we achieve the necessary levels of collaboration, which are still held up by problems of confidentiality, competition,
varying priorities, levels of competence, and free-rider issues?
The promising news is that Jack’s energy, creativity, and passion are focused on these challenges. We need more like Jack –
sufficiently knowledgeable and thoughtful to serve as crap detectors, but able to think critically about practical steps forward.
While the debates taking place around ESG are challenging and sometimes frustrating, they reflect a changing fiduciary compass.
It’s going to take a concerted effort to get it to continue to shift in the right direction.
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Endnotes
1. I am grateful to EdWaitzer and Ryan Pollice for their comments on this response.
2. Further, it seems a relatively common mistake for responsible investment
professionals to overemphasize the relative importance of ESG, and
effectively end up telling mainstream analysts or investors that they are
stupid. In my experience this is not an effective approach.
3. In a recent presentation on global security at Mercer’s Asia-Pacific
Investment Forum (March 2012), General Sir Rupert Smith, author and
one of Britain’s most distinguished generals, argued that we are currently
undergoing a “slow-burning revolution” shaped by these forces. Further,
his number-one recommendation to ensure global stability was to protect
the global commons. This means beginning to properly value things like
carbon and water.
4. An example is the case of lobbying on the Volcker Rule. From July 2010 to
October 2011, financial institutions met with federal agencies to discuss it some
351 times, while public-interest groups held just 19 meetings (Lowrey 2012).
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Jack Gray concludes “Misadventures of an Irresponsible Investor” on a solid note, but careens alarmingly on the way there.
Throughout the piece he wrestles with a foundational problem in capital markets: the citizen-investors who are the chief suppliers
of capital to markets today represent virtually the same universe as citizen-taxpayers. Can it make sense that agents for each –
institutional investors, on the one hand, and governments, on the other – behave in diametrically opposite ways? Most concepts of
fiduciary duty seem to require this. Investing agents are to focus solely on narrow financials, ignoring systemic or extra-financial
risks such as those expressed in the term ESG (environmental, social, and governance), which almost certainly bear on the long-
term interests of grassroots beneficiaries. Gray seems to recognize by the end that this division between fiduciary and citizen duty
is ultimately arbitrary and irrational, for example with respect to denuding global forests. The division is in fact a legacy of a long-
disappeared capital market in which collective investment vehicles were trivial players. Such funds have grown to dominate equity
ownership, but fiduciary duties guiding their behavior remain stuck in the early twentieth century.
The moment has indeed come to revisit fiduciary duty, and thinkers around the world – led by the Rotman International Centre
for Pension Management, the Network for Sustainable Financial Markets, Fairpensions, and others – have begun this process.
Gray does not particularly delve into the policy implications of the contradictions he outlines. Instead, he gets distracted – and
entertainingly steamed – by sideshow misconceptions. For instance, he suggests that a shareowner’s focus on ESG analysis will
lead it to overpay for top-ranked stocks. In fact, investing shops commonly embed ESG factors to capture value even (maybe
especially) where companies fall short. Gray is irritated that Citigroup can call itself a center of “responsible finance.” But, believe
me, few institutions will take that claim seriously just because CEO Vikram Pandit says so. Gray lashes fanatical investors in the
United States who see ESG as the sole issue, but these are straw men; such institutions don’t exist in great numbers. In truth, the
more common criticism of mainstreamAmerican investors is that not enough of them acknowledge ESG factors as risk factors.
Where they do, ESG is simply woven into investment analysis. Gray gets stuck on the word “responsible,” arguing that the term
should imply identical investor approaches to issues such as nuclear power. But being a “responsible” investor is really about
making conscious and informed decisions aligned with the interests of beneficiaries. Outcomes may very well vary, on nuclear
power and other matters, among different funds with different constituencies.
Gray contends that the frictions between fiduciary and citizen duties have been most harmful when governments have sold state
assets into the private sector; short-term ownership resulted, to the detriment of the public good. Well, if he thinks we privatized
too much before, just wait for what’s coming. Debt-strapped governments are planning to spin off record numbers of enterprises
to the market – even Prince William’s helicopter rescue unit is to be sold. The issue to be addressed may be less about privatization
than about the behavior of investors who inherit such assets. This brings us back to fiduciary duty. A fund that caters to citizen-
investors could start by doing what the United Kingdom’s National Employment Savings Trust (NEST) does: conducting
comprehensive research on the “characteristics, circumstances and attitudes” of members, and then shaping policies accordingly.
Findings have led NEST to plan a long-term ownership focus that embeds ESG risk factors. Gray seems to ask why a fund should
bow to such desires. Perhaps the better question is: Why should it not?
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In “Misadventures of an Irresponsible Investor,” Jack Gray expresses his frustration with the seemingly irreconcilable differences
between the investment methodology used by mainstream financial investors and approaches advocated by investors who incorporate
environmental, social, and governance (ESG) factors into their investment practices. He finds fault with both belief systems and
ends up feeling “unsatisfied and self-irritated.” Much of his angst is attributed to the “separation of fiduciary and citizens’ duties”
seemingly mandated by the legal constraints of the sole purpose test, which requires that fiduciaries manage assets solely in the
interest of fund participants and for the exclusive purpose of providing promised benefits.1
Déjà vu All Over Again
Gray’s rant sounds eerily familiar. Turn the clock back 25 years, and fiduciaries of the 1980s confronted similar irreconcilable
differences that involved competing views of fiduciary duty. A February 1988 review of a new book, Modern Investment
Management and the Prudent Man Rule (Longstreth 1986), offers the following description of the conundrum faced by
fiduciaries of that time:
The prudent man rule creates a legal paradox: It forces fiduciaries into an inherent contradiction. A fiduciary cannot
behave as a careful, wise, discreet, judicious and prudent man if he acts within the strictures of a prudent man rule
that forces him to behave imprudently in the contemporary economic marketplace. (Nicholas 1988, 779)
Of course, we now know how that contradiction was resolved: views of prudent investing that were based on legal lists of inherently
prudent and imprudent investments were discarded in favor of modern portfolio theory. As part of that evolution, guidance was
added to the Restatement of Trusts, Third (1992, §227, Comment (f)) cautioning that “there are no universally accepted and
enduring theories of financial markets or prescriptions for investment that can provide clear and specific guidance to trustees
and courts” (emphasis added).
All signs point to a similar present-day evolution taking place in our understanding of fiduciary duty. As Jeremy Grantham (2009, 2)
observed, “The incredibly inaccurate efficient market theory [caused] a lethally dangerous combination of asset bubbles, lax
controls, pernicious incentives and wickedly complicated instruments that led to our current plight.” Washington Post financial
journalist Roger Lowenstein (2009) was more direct: “The upside of the current Great Recession is that it could drive a stake
through the heart of the academic nostrum known as the efficient-market hypothesis.”2
Winds of Change Are Blowing
Much has changed in the global economy and markets since modern portfolio theory and the efficient-market hypothesis became
the predominant investment approach during the last half of the twentieth century. Since then, advances in information technology
have fundamentally changed the investment industry, introducing levels of complexity, speed, and short-termism that were
unfathomable only a few decades ago. The growth of assets managed by institutional investors has turned the latter into economic
powerhouses, collectively asserting unparalleled influence on society through their investment and capital allocation decisions.
New cadres of consultants, advisors, and investment intermediaries have sprung up, diluting governing fiduciaries’ accountability
to their beneficiaries.3 Most importantly, a series of highly destructive economic crises over the past decade has undermined faith
in the only set of investment beliefs that an entire generation of financial industry professionals has known.
Gray recognizes these challenges to mainstream financial industry practices, but he struggles to find an acceptable alternative.
He is troubled by “the ever-changing names and nature” of different ESG investment styles, even though he treats integration of
ESG factors as a compelling replacement. The primary roadblock to adoption of an ESG approach, he argues, is the sole purpose
test of fiduciary duty.
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Fiduciary Duty Is a Flexible Concept
After several decades of investment-industry domination by modern portfolio theory and efficient-market beliefs, investment
professionals (and many lawyers) have mistakenly come to view prevailing applications of finance theory as synonymous with
fiduciary duty. However, the Restatement of Trusts, Third (1992, §227, Introduction), clearly states, “Trust investment law should
reflect and accommodate current knowledge and concepts. It should avoid repeating the mistake of freezing its rules against future
learning and developments.”
If current investment practices are no longer fit for purpose in the twenty-first century, fiduciaries are not stuck with them. In the
words of Bevis Longstreth, the leading commentator on fiduciary duty during its last great evolution, “Investment products and
techniques are essentially neutral; none should be classified prudent or imprudent per se. It is the way in which they are used,
and how decisions as to their use are made, that should be examined to determine whether the prudence standard has been met”
(Longstreth 1986, qtd. in Nicholas 1988, 784).
The Sole Purpose Test Is Multiple Choice
“Misadventures of an Irresponsible Investor” also falls prey to a popular misconception about fiduciary duty. Many industry
professionals mistakenly believe that the duty of loyalty, which includes the sole purpose test, requires fiduciaries to maximize
short-term returns without regard to the longer-term consequences and systemic risks generated by their behavior. Nothing could
be further from the truth.
In fact, governing fiduciaries are legally required to take a balanced approach that impartially balances the different short- and
long-term interests of fund participants (Hawley, Johnson, and Waitzer 2011, 8). The US Supreme Court has specifically held
that the fiduciary duty of loyalty extends not to the plan itself but to the beneficiaries as individuals.4
Under the duty of loyalty, fiduciaries cannot turn a blind eye to material risks and opportunities that are relevant to delivery
of sustainable pension benefits to the human beings who are fund beneficiaries, especially if the fiduciaries’ own management
practices amplify those risks. Risks to the interests of beneficiaries in a sustainable retirement must be recognized and, to the
extent reasonably practicable, must be managed in a way that is consistent with the interests of both current and future retirees.5
From a fiduciary duty standpoint, it is irrelevant that a risk factor or investment opportunity might be viewed as inconsistent
with someone’s moral values or personal beliefs; the duty of loyalty question is whether or not something affects delivery of
intergenerationally equitable pension security.
However, many issues presumed to be beyond the bounds of investment theory or market-relative benchmarks can have
systemic effects or involve consequences for the sustainability of an impartial standard of retirement security across generations.
Environmental degradation and concerns about public health and public safety are prime examples. For instance, while common
resources might be regarded as free goods or seen as irrelevant externalities in the context of traditional investment analysis,
investment practices that contribute to water scarcity, air pollution, economic instability, energy shortages, rising health care costs,
or food-supply contamination problems are highly relevant and material to the future economic interests of human pension-fund
members. Analysis of the knock-on effects of investment practices, which may be invisible when viewed through a market-relative
lens, takes on greater importance when viewed from the perspectives of fund participants and beneficiaries.
This confusion between market theory and the fiduciary duty of loyalty also generates frustration in “Misadventures of an Irresponsible
Investor” about the separation of fiduciary and citizens’ duties. In the twenty-first century, however, institutional investor fiduciaries
have accumulated sufficient collective assets to exert a major influence on economic stability, business development, and the future
of society. By default, institutional investors now affect public-policy decisions through their decisions about capital allocation,
investments, and risk management. Even decisions to not decide can influence society and public policy.
For example, investor decisions to ignore the short- and long-term risks or benefits to beneficiaries of investing in nuclear-power
companies or in alternative-energy companies become, through their collective impact, a public-policy decision with societal
implications. Whether intentionally or not, institutional investor fiduciaries wield incredible influence, even by protecting the status
quo. The challenge for fiduciaries is whether their influence is being managed in the interests of participants and beneficiaries.6
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Fiduciaries are not required by the sole purpose test to pretend that their investment, capital-allocation, and risk-management
decisions have no broader impact. They are also not immunized from responsibility for the reasonably foreseeable effects of
choosing not to make a decision. While finance theory might ignore systemic effects of investment activities or the long-term
financial impact of ESG factors, the fiduciary duty of loyalty is not so limited. Actions (and inactions) of fiduciaries must be
both for the purpose of providing future benefits and in the interests of the human beings who are pension-fund participants and
beneficiaries, in an intergenerationally unbiased manner. Viewed through the duty of loyalty, citizens’ and fiduciaries’ duties are
often opposite sides of the same coin.
The Way Forward
“Misadventures of an Irresponsible Investor” ends with a plea for reassessment of the sole purpose test in the context of
shortcomings associated with the dominant investment paradigm. However, there is nothing that bars the door to doing so for
investors who apply a balanced view of fiduciary duty – other than institutional investor inertia. Fiduciary obligations are not
circumscribed by popular finance theory.
Experience from the 1980s and from prior evolutionary transitions in the understanding of fiduciary duty should provide comfort
to investors who fear they are embarking on a misadventure. During that time period, trustees began to widely ignore old views of
prudence in response to new developments (Nicholas 1998, 782). The tension and confusion Gray describes are likely a sign that
the popular understanding of fiduciary duty is once again at odds with economic reality and getting ready for a new transition.
Indeed, recent research has demonstrated that experienced asset managers with specialized ESG expertise can outperform
conventional managers.7 The potpourri of sustainable investment approaches described in “Misadventures of an Irresponsible
Investor” appears to have been nothing more than the evolution over time of efforts to address the disconnect between prevailing
finance theory and fundamental principles of fiduciary duty. What began as ethical investing has grown into an increasingly
sophisticated and integrated ESG investment approach that is still evolving (see Fulton et al. 2012).
However, the momentum for change is growing. Perhaps the next plateau will be an integrated investment approach that combines
financial, environmental, social, governance, and company engagement (FESGE) practices. One thing is certain: investment
models better suited to a properly balanced application of fiduciary duties in the twenty-first century will evolve only if investors
devote the effort and resources to develop them. An equitable and sustainable future for pension-fund benefits depends on it.
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Endnotes
1. In the United States, the sole purpose test for private pension funds is set
forth in §404(a)(1) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA). It requires that fiduciaries discharge their duties “in the interest
of the participants and beneficiaries and for the exclusive purpose of
providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries and defraying
reasonable expenses of administering the plan” (emphasis added).
2. Lowenstein (2009) quotes Yale University economist Robert Shiller as
calling the efficient-markets hypothesis “the most remarkable error in the
history of economic theory.” See also Rajan (2012) for a critique of modern
portfolio theory and practices.
3. See Hawley et al. (2011) and Davis (2012) for discussions of market
changes and their effects on the application of fiduciary duty.
4. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 514 (1996).
5. See Hawley et al. (2011) and the Restatement of Trusts, Third (1992, §78),
for discussions of the duty of loyalty.
6. The importance of institutional investor governance is highlighted by the
default role these investors play in economics and policy making.
7. Gil-Bazo, Ruiz-Verdu, and Santos (2010) found that SRI specialists outperformed
conventional funds with similar characteristics during their 1997–2005 study
period. Kurtz and diBartolomeo (2011) conclude that social investment
portfolios performed on a par with unconstrained portfolios between 1992
and 2010, when adjusted for investment factors. See also Fulton, Kahn, and
Sharples (2012), who tracked the evolution of the different styles of sustainable
investing and examined their returns. Their study, which differentiated
evolving ESG investment approaches from prior iterations focused on
exclusionary screens, found that more advanced ESG investment strategies
correlate with superior risk-adjusted returns over the medium and long term.
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